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Foreword	  Regional	  integration	  remains	  an	  important	  topic	  in	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador,	  as	  it	  is	  throughout	  Atlantic	  Canada	  and	  Northeastern	  U.S.	  The	  research	  sponsored	  by	  Harris	  Centre	  has	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  share	  knowledge	  and	  information	  across	  both	  jurisdictions	  as	  well	  as	  policy	  fields.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  paper	  produced	  has	  been	  submitted	  and	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Canadian-­‐American	  Public	  Policy	  (CAPP).	  The	  author	  would	  like	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  thank	  all	  the	  partners,	  the	  Harris	  Centre,	  and	  the	  various	  people	  who	  either	  contributed	  materials	  or	  were	  willing	  to	  be	  interviewed.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  research	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  narrative	  that	  will	  hopefully	  supply	  an	  opportunity	  for	  public	  and	  academic	  debate	  on	  the	  future	  of	  regional	  collaboration	  in	  eastern	  North	  American	  and	  beyond.	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Myth	  and	  Reality	  in	  Eastern	  Canada-­‐Northeastern	  U.S.	  Regionalism	  
	  
For	  generations,	  boosters	  of	  regionalization	  (whether	  within	  or	  across	  provincial/state	  
borders)	  have	  talked	  about	  the	  inevitability	  of	  change,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  bring	  different	  
interests	  together	  to	  produce	  common	  or	  shared	  objectives	  and	  values.	  	  It	  was	  assumed	  
that	  given	  the	  realities	  of	  interdependence	  it	  was	  only	  logical	  and	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  that	  
those	  in	  positions	  of	  power	  would	  naturally	  find	  ways	  to	  collaborate	  and	  not	  compete.	  	  
But	  there	  have	  always	  been	  challenges	  connected	  with	  getting	  powerful	  and	  
autonomous	  institutional	  actors	  to	  change	  their	  behavior	  according	  to	  a	  functional	  -­‐	  
regional	  script,	  whether	  in	  Europe	  or	  North	  America.	  	  Despite	  optimistic	  forecasts	  about	  
the	  inevitability	  of	  regional	  integration	  based	  on	  a	  functional	  analysis,	  territorial	  
impulses	  anchored	  by	  inherited	  political	  -­‐	  institutional	  games	  have	  created	  other	  
challenges.	  	  None	  of	  this	  was	  ever	  easy,	  since	  these	  actors	  played	  to	  dissimilar	  
audiences,	  and	  operated	  in	  competing	  political-­‐institutional	  contexts	  that	  rewarded	  
defending	  local	  but	  not	  regional	  interests.	  	  	  
	  
Regionalism	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  a	  difficult	  balancing	  act.	  	  It	  has	  sparked	  much	  debate	  
between	  scholars	  who	  have	  had	  different	  perspectives	  on	  whether	  regional	  integration	  
was,	  in	  fact,	  inevitable	  (given	  challenges	  of	  interdependence)	  or	  whether	  state	  actors	  
had	  the	  autonomy	  and	  capacity	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  change.	  	  	  Regionalism	  involves	  a	  
debate	  over	  the	  power	  of	  ideas,	  interests,	  institutions,	  and	  identity.	  	  
	  
The	  paper	  compares	  Atlantic	  Canada	  and	  the	  northeastern	  U.S.	  	  We	  report	  that	  
regionalism	  has	  been	  losing	  momentum	  in	  recent	  years	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border.	  	  
The	  energy	  sector	  has	  served	  as	  a	  central	  focus	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  We	  describe	  how	  the	  
historical-­‐institutional	  context	  has	  influenced	  recent	  changes.	  	  Since	  1973,	  the	  
Conference	  of	  New	  England	  Governors	  and	  Eastern	  Premiers	  has	  met	  to	  discuss	  
common	  issues	  and	  problems.	  	  But	  much	  has	  changed	  with	  the	  decision	  to	  consolidate	  
the	  New	  England	  Governors’	  Conference	  (NEGC)	  into	  the	  Coalition	  of	  Eastern	  Governors	  
Conference	  (CONEG).	  	  We	  discuss	  these	  recent	  changes	  and	  why	  it	  is	  not	  business	  as	  
usual	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border.	  	  Emphasis	  is	  placed	  on	  describing	  the	  changes	  that	  
have	  occurred,	  the	  factors	  that	  have	  shaped	  these	  outcomes,	  and	  why	  they	  matter.	  	  	  
	  
The	  literature	  on	  state-­‐society	  relations	  offers	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  for	  assessing	  the	  roles	  of	  
ideas,	  interests,	  and	  institutions	  on	  patterns	  of	  restructuring,	  regional	  or	  not.	  	  Domestic	  
-­‐	  structural	  frameworks	  (such	  as	  culturalism,	  institutionalism,	  and	  incrementalism)	  
propose	  that	  “structural”	  factors	  within	  civil	  society	  or	  the	  state	  restrict	  what	  is	  possible	  
or	  doable	  and	  focus	  within	  state	  boundaries.1	  	  For	  example,	  institutionalists	  assume	  that	  
governance	  structures	  and	  processes	  are	  more	  autonomous	  and	  capable	  within	  
themselves	  of	  either	  promoting	  or	  constraining	  political	  changes	  and	  policy	  reform.	  	  
Structural	  thinkers	  raise	  critical	  questions	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  co-­‐opting	  of	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new	  movements	  and	  ideas	  within	  entrenched	  structural	  institutions	  is	  likely	  to	  produce	  
real	  reforms	  or	  new	  types	  of	  knowledge	  construction	  and	  innovation.	  	  
	  
Pluralism	  offers	  a	  more	  dynamic,	  optimistic	  perspective	  on	  transformation	  and	  
restructuring.	  	  It	  is	  assumed	  that	  reform	  is	  possible,	  but	  based	  on	  competition	  that	  is	  
open,	  transparent	  and	  engages	  the	  public.	  	  	  In	  an	  ideal	  pluralist	  world,	  change	  comes	  
naturally,	  even	  “inevitably,”	  since	  as	  conditions	  change,	  new	  forms	  of	  group	  competition	  
and	  networking	  emerge	  to	  contest	  and	  replace	  old	  ideas,	  interests,	  and	  even	  
institutions.	  	  But	  such	  transformation	  (if	  it	  is	  to	  occur)	  requires	  that	  processes	  and	  
mechanisms	  are	  open,	  public,	  and	  facilitate	  interaction,	  competition,	  and	  the	  sharing	  of	  
knowledge	  in	  public	  places.	  	  
	  
The	  international	  policy	  literature	  offers	  other	  ways	  for	  framing	  the	  regional	  integration	  
issue.	  	  There	  is	  much	  discussion	  over	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  democratic	  deficit,	  the	  need	  for	  
legitimacy,	  problems	  associated	  with	  entrenched	  state	  sovereignty,	  and	  limited	  regional	  
institutions	  that	  constrain	  regional	  knowledge	  and	  sense	  of	  community.2	  Functionalism	  
is	  informed	  by	  the	  European	  model.	  	  It	  is	  based	  on	  technical	  assumptions	  and	  on	  the	  
idea	  that	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  naturally	  drive	  new	  patterns	  of	  cross-­‐border	  
collaboration	  and	  sources	  of	  power.	  	  Policymaking	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  surrounding	  
context	  are	  seen	  as	  trumping	  old	  patterns	  of	  politics.	  	  As	  we	  have	  witnessed	  in	  past	  
research,	  increasing	  patterns	  of	  interdependence	  and	  convergence	  have	  not	  by	  
themselves	  created	  deeper	  levels	  of	  regional	  integration.	  	  	  
	  
The	  federalist	  and	  new	  regionalism	  international	  literatures	  offer	  alternative	  ways	  for	  
thinking	  about	  the	  integration	  question.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada,	  integration	  
has	  been	  approached	  from	  more	  of	  an	  institutional	  perspective	  than	  in	  Europe.	  	  In	  both	  
thought	  and	  action,	  the	  need	  to	  defend	  state	  sovereignty	  has	  remained	  paramount,	  and	  
there	  has	  been	  much	  less	  appetite	  for	  building	  cross-­‐border	  or	  international	  institutions	  
in	  both	  practice	  and	  discourse.3	  	  But	  also,	  for	  those	  academics	  who	  have	  looked	  at	  
integration	  from	  a	  civil	  society	  North	  American	  perspective,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  assumed	  (as	  
was	  the	  case	  in	  Europe)	  that	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  business	  
interests)	  would	  naturally	  embrace	  integration	  as	  a	  good	  thing.4	  	  	  These	  theorists	  offer	  
other	  insights	  on	  the	  dynamics	  that	  shape	  regional	  outcomes.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  approach	  informing	  this	  paper	  is	  historical	  –	  institutional.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  recent	  
changes	  in	  regional	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  in	  New	  England	  and	  
Eastern	  Canada	  have	  undermined	  public	  debate	  and	  worked	  against	  the	  goal	  of	  regional	  
integration.	  	  Our	  approach	  pays	  close	  attention	  to	  governance	  structures	  and	  processes	  
that	  promote	  or	  constrain	  patterns	  of	  regional	  communication,	  networking,	  and	  
knowledge	  brokering.	  
	  
Cross-­‐border	  regionalism	  is	  a	  topic	  the	  authors	  have	  researched	  for	  decades.	  	  Our	  intent	  
is	  not	  to	  simply	  repeat	  messages	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  rather,	  to	  highlight	  and	  explain	  recent	  
changes	  and	  events.5	  	  Recently,	  we	  have	  embarked	  upon	  a	  regional	  journey	  that	  has	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taken	  us	  to	  New	  England,	  New	  York,	  and	  Atlantic	  Canada	  in	  a	  search	  of	  an	  old	  question:	  
Is	  regionalism	  more	  myth	  than	  reality?	  	  The	  story	  is	  one	  that	  has	  unfolded,	  for	  the	  most	  
part,	  behind	  closed	  doors,	  without	  expert	  involvement,	  interest	  group	  competition,	  
media	  commentary,	  or	  civic	  engagement.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  objective	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  describe,	  from	  a	  historical-­‐institutional	  perspective,	  why	  
the	  prospects	  for	  regional	  collaboration	  have	  declined	  in	  recent	  times.	  	  It	  is	  a	  tale	  about	  
how	  political	  actors	  were	  influenced	  more	  by	  the	  political-­‐institutional	  realities	  within	  
which	  they	  operated	  than	  by	  inherited	  ideas	  about	  regions	  and	  regionalism	  that	  lacked	  
legitimacy	  and	  institutional	  support.	  	  We	  are	  living	  in	  an	  era	  when	  regional	  collaboration	  
in	  New	  England	  and	  Eastern	  Canada	  is	  in	  serious	  decline,	  but	  there	  is	  little	  public	  
knowledge	  or	  discussion	  of	  this	  development.	  	  Particularly	  in	  the	  energy	  sector,	  
competition	  is	  heating	  up	  as	  different	  provinces	  and	  states	  square	  off	  in	  a	  new	  political	  
game	  where	  there	  is	  little	  common	  regional	  debate	  or	  effort	  to	  bring	  dissimilar	  interests	  
together	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  benefit	  all.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  narrative	  
that	  supplies	  an	  opportunity	  for	  public	  and	  academic	  debate	  on	  the	  future	  of	  regional	  
collaboration	  in	  eastern	  North	  America	  and	  beyond.	  	  
	  
Roger	  Gibbins	  has	  argued	  that	  regionalism	  in	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States	  has	  had	  
different	  meanings.6	  	  In	  Canada,	  regionalism	  has	  been	  more	  competitive,	  and	  involved	  
pushing	  provincial	  issues	  and	  agendas	  onto	  the	  national	  agenda.	  	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  this	  has	  
been	  considered	  “sectionalism”	  and	  not	  collaboration	  at	  all.	  	  Much	  of	  this	  was	  thought	  
to	  be	  connected	  to	  differences	  between	  the	  Canadian	  “interstate”	  and	  the	  American	  
“intrastate”	  systems	  of	  federalism.	  	  	  
	  
We	  argue	  that	  New	  England	  has	  become	  more	  competitive	  than	  cooperative.	  	  Despite	  
the	  persistence	  of	  the	  intrastate	  model,	  the	  combination	  of	  increasingly	  partisan	  politics	  
and	  a	  more	  insular	  pattern	  of	  intergovernmental	  relations	  has	  contributed	  to	  an	  era	  of	  
increased	  conflict	  and	  competition	  across	  state	  boundaries,	  particularly	  in	  the	  energy	  
policy	  field.	  	  	  We	  also	  argue	  that	  Canadian	  regional	  competition	  over	  energy	  
infrastructural	  development	  in	  the	  New	  England	  and	  Northeast	  region	  has	  contributed	  
to	  this	  trend.	  	  	  
	  
But	  we	  also	  recognize	  there	  remain	  clear	  differences	  between	  how	  Canadian	  provinces	  
and	  American	  states	  define	  or	  view	  policy	  problems	  and	  then	  solve	  them.	  	  While	  
Canadian	  premiers	  focus	  much	  attention	  on	  province	  building,	  and	  the	  provincial	  state,	  
American	  public	  institutions	  are	  very	  different.	  	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  there	  is	  little	  discussion	  of	  
the	  need	  to	  defend	  or	  promote	  state	  jurisdictional	  powers	  and	  associational	  patterns	  of	  
development	  through	  energy	  infrastructural	  development	  comparable	  to	  Canadian	  
provinces.	  	  Rather,	  befitting	  the	  differences	  in	  constitutional	  heritage	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  
Canada,	  Americans	  focus	  more	  on	  individual	  rights	  instead	  of	  state	  or	  collective	  rights.	  	  
They	  perceive	  government	  as	  more	  of	  a	  problem	  than	  a	  solution,	  whether	  regional	  or	  
national.	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These	  differences	  in	  cultural-­‐institutional	  traditions	  are	  clearly	  reflected,	  for	  example,	  in	  
the	  fact	  that	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  (NL)	  has	  recently	  embraced	  a	  defensive	  
expansionist7	  monopoly	  approach	  to	  power	  development	  (both	  internally	  and	  
externally)	  while	  Maine	  and	  other	  New	  England	  states	  abandoned	  the	  old	  utilities	  
model,	  forced	  large	  utilities	  to	  give	  up	  hydro	  assets,	  and	  then	  created	  deregulated	  
markets.	  	  	  As	  argued	  by	  James	  Feehan,	  such	  an	  approach	  to	  policy	  choice	  in	  NL	  conflicts	  
with	  ideas	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  promoting	  new	  patterns	  of	  regional	  integration.8	  	  Its	  policy	  
may	  also	  prevent	  NL	  from	  accessing	  the	  U.S.	  markets,	  since	  it	  goes	  against	  the	  
reciprocity	  rules	  enforced	  by	  the	  Federal	  Energy	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (FERC).	  	  These	  
recent	  actions	  of	  the	  NL	  government	  clearly	  show	  that	  convergence	  and	  integration	  are	  
not	  “inevitable,”	  and	  that	  politics	  does	  sometimes	  trump	  policy	  and	  economic	  logic,	  
even	  in	  an	  era	  of	  free	  trade.	  	  Province-­‐building	  has	  survived	  and	  much	  of	  this	  is	  
connected	  with	  state	  capacity	  and	  autonomy.	  	  	  
	  
Regional	  integration	  and	  the	  past	  activities	  of	  the	  New	  England	  Governors’	  Conference	  
(NEGC)	  and	  Coalition	  of	  Eastern	  Governors	  (CONEG)	  have	  never	  been	  that	  visible	  or	  
sexy.	  	  	  The	  most	  important	  work	  involved	  staff	  sharing	  knowledge,	  being	  aware	  of	  
perspectives	  of	  other	  states	  in	  the	  region,	  and	  finding	  new	  ways	  to	  work	  together,	  pool	  
resources,	  integrate,	  learn	  from	  one	  another,	  and	  push	  a	  common	  agenda	  onto	  national	  
issues.	  	  They	  did	  all	  this	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  politically	  viable,	  and	  made	  their	  bosses	  look	  
good.	  	  NEGC	  was	  very	  much	  an	  inside	  baseball	  game,	  whose	  principal	  work	  was	  done	  by	  
staff	  with	  occasional	  but	  regular	  appearances	  by	  governors.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  staff	  (or	  
experts)	  did	  most	  of	  the	  work,	  but	  the	  governors	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  legitimize	  these	  
informal	  efforts	  and	  results	  through	  regular	  public	  meetings	  or	  conferences.	  	  	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  these	  efforts	  created	  new	  patterns	  of	  integration	  and	  interaction	  that	  
survived	  as	  long	  as	  they	  did,	  suggests	  that	  there	  was	  value	  in	  these	  informal	  
experiments	  in	  community	  building	  and	  in	  the	  ongoing	  struggle	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  steer	  
together,	  and	  construct	  shared	  objectives,	  rather	  than	  to	  work	  at	  cross-­‐purposes.	  	  
Despite	  limitations,	  there	  were	  clear	  benefits	  to	  the	  old	  regime	  and	  bargain.	  	  	  	  
	  
We	  argue	  that	  the	  recent	  shift	  from	  the	  Boston-­‐based	  organization	  (NEGC)	  to	  a	  
Washington	  DC	  based	  organization	  (CONEG)	  represents	  a	  shift	  to	  an	  even	  more	  diffuse,	  
less	  legitimate,	  less	  effective	  approach	  to	  regional	  governance.	  	  Since	  CONEG	  never	  
actually	  meets,	  at	  the	  principals’	  level	  there	  is	  less	  opportunity	  for	  promoting	  new	  forms	  
of	  knowledge	  sharing,	  and	  reinforcing	  new	  patterns	  of	  regional	  integration/interaction.	  	  	  
The	  annual	  meetings	  of	  the	  governors	  were	  pro	  forma	  in	  many	  ways,	  but	  the	  staff	  work	  
created	  a	  regional	  bridge	  that	  facilitated	  regional	  network	  building,	  policy	  learning,	  and	  
knowledge	  exchange.	  	  We	  need	  to	  understand	  what	  changed	  and	  likely	  impacts	  on	  
future	  patterns	  of	  regional	  governance.	  	  	  
	  
Several	  factors	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  New	  England	  regional	  institutional	  
capacity	  and	  knowledge	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  These	  include	  increased	  challenges	  associated	  
with	  hyper	  -­‐	  partisanship;	  decline	  in	  the	  status	  of	  experts	  and	  regional	  networks	  that	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historically	  supported	  formal	  regional	  processes;	  declining	  faith	  in	  rational	  planning;	  
declining	  political	  and	  financial	  resources;	  and	  a	  pattern	  of	  intergovernmental	  relations	  
where	  the	  focus	  is	  more	  informal	  (outside	  the	  public	  view).	  	  	  Finally,	  we	  will	  discuss	  
challenges	  connected	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  competitive	  forms	  of	  energy	  in	  North	  America.9	  
Is	  New	  England	  Regionalism	  in	  Decline?	  
	  
Within	  the	  past	  year,	  the	  New	  England	  Governors’	  Conference	  has	  changed	  in	  a	  
fundamental	  way.	  	  But	  there	  was	  little	  public	  knowledge,	  debate	  or	  understanding	  that	  
a	  tradition	  that	  has	  gone	  back	  generations	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  institutional	  reality.	  	  Nor	  was	  
there	  much	  understanding	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  closing	  down	  the	  Boston	  operation	  entirely,	  
consolidating	  with	  New	  York	  and	  other	  mid-­‐Atlantic	  states,	  downsizing	  services,	  and	  
reinventing	  the	  Coalition	  of	  Northeastern	  Governors.	  	  The	  NEGC	  is	  no	  longer	  
incorporated;	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  staff	  dedicated	  to	  pushing	  regional	  knowledge	  and	  
working	  across	  boundaries.10	  	  Instead,	  we	  have	  seen	  a	  much	  more	  informal	  CONEG,	  with	  
headquarters	  located	  outside	  the	  region	  it	  serves,	  take	  over	  these	  tasks.	  The	  expanded	  
CONEG	  maintains	  that	  it	  is	  business	  as	  usual,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  In	  the	  new	  
arrangement,	  New	  York	  is	  supposedly	  an	  actor	  within	  this	  new	  regional	  organization.	  	  
Yet,	  New	  York	  tends	  to	  consider	  itself	  as	  an	  entity	  in	  itself,	  and	  few	  people	  view	  New	  
England	  and	  the	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  states	  as	  a	  natural	  region.	  There	  are	  few	  signs	  that	  
regionalization	  in	  New	  England	  is	  business	  as	  usual,	  despite	  the	  messages	  to	  the	  
contrary.	  	  	  
	  
In	  Eastern	  Canada,	  there	  have	  also	  been	  cuts	  in	  staff,	  namely	  the	  people	  who	  had	  been	  
working	  on	  the	  New	  England	  file.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  cuts	  came	  after	  the	  
demise	  of	  the	  New	  England	  Governors.	  As	  a	  result,	  regional	  capacity	  building	  and	  
knowledge	  sharing	  is	  in	  decline	  within	  the	  New	  England	  Governors	  and	  Eastern	  Premiers	  
organization.	  	  	  	  While	  regional	  governance	  has	  always	  be	  shallow	  and	  offered	  limited	  
opportunities	  for	  sharing	  knowledge,	  engaging	  networks,	  or	  citizens,	  the	  integration	  
option	  is	  losing	  momentum.11	  	  	  
	  
All	  of	  these	  changes	  to	  the	  New	  England	  Governors	  organization	  have	  occurred,	  despite	  
ongoing	  challenges	  associated	  with	  growing	  interdependence,	  particularly	  in	  the	  energy	  
sector.	  	  But,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  the	  past,	  external	  economic	  and	  technological	  changes	  
alone	  have	  not	  always	  stimulated	  institutional	  reform.	  	  Regions	  require	  a	  common	  sense	  
of	  community,	  system	  of	  interaction,	  communication,	  and	  opportunity	  to	  network,	  and	  
they	  bring	  different	  interests	  together.	  
	  	  	  	  	  
While	  Allan	  and	  Vengroff	  have	  recently	  argued	  that	  “paradiplomacy”	  and	  subnational	  
relations	  are	  flourishing,	  recent	  changes	  in	  the	  New	  England	  Governors/Eastern	  
Premiers	  regional	  experiment	  suggest	  otherwise.12	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  much	  of	  this	  
activity	  has	  not	  been	  on	  the	  public	  radar	  screen.	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Hyper-­‐	  Partisanship	  and	  Province-­‐building	  	  
	  
Personalities	  and	  the	  ways	  political	  actors	  perceive	  one	  another	  are	  large	  factors	  in	  
determining	  patterns	  of	  collaboration	  or	  competition.	  	  There	  has	  always	  been	  much	  
academic	  debate	  about	  whether	  external	  challenges	  matter	  more	  than	  internal	  
historical	  –	  institutional	  structures	  inherited	  by	  decision-­‐makers.13	  New	  England	  
regionalism	  has	  always	  depended	  on	  governors	  who	  managed	  to	  get	  along	  and	  
understood	  the	  value	  of	  bringing	  different	  interests	  together	  and	  finding	  ways	  to	  build	  
the	  kind	  of	  regional	  knowledge	  and	  capacity	  essential	  for	  addressing	  challenges	  of	  
interdependence.	  	  But	  operating	  in	  different	  contexts	  and	  playing	  for	  dissimilar	  
audiences	  has	  never	  been	  easy	  for	  governors.	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  past,	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  NEGC	  understood	  the	  challenges	  associated	  in	  selling	  a	  
regional	  vision	  within	  competitive	  state	  structures,	  and	  they	  did	  what	  they	  could	  to	  
collaborate	  closely	  with	  the	  personal	  political	  staffs	  of	  the	  governors	  in	  each	  state.	  	  In	  
turn,	  there	  was	  support	  and	  understanding	  among	  governors	  that	  good	  regional	  
governance	  brought	  positive	  outcomes	  for	  all,	  especially	  in	  areas	  like	  transportation,	  
energy	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  were	  challenges	  along	  the	  way,	  but	  
there	  were	  governors	  who	  were	  champions	  of	  regionalization.	  	  They	  made	  sure	  that	  key	  
people	  in	  their	  administration	  were	  involved,	  and	  this	  sent	  a	  strong	  message	  that	  it	  was	  
a	  priority.14	  	  Even	  when	  the	  regional	  commission	  was	  cut	  in	  1981	  and	  there	  were	  fewer	  
resources	  for	  regional	  coordination,	  there	  remained	  a	  political	  commitment	  to	  bringing	  
different	  interests	  together	  and	  promoting	  common	  shared	  objectives.	  	  With	  the	  lead	  of	  
Governors	  like	  Michael	  Dukakis	  and	  his	  commitment	  to	  funding	  these	  kinds	  of	  activities,	  
the	  other	  governors	  in	  the	  region	  rallied	  in	  support	  of	  the	  regional	  idea.	  	  
	  
But	  that	  was	  a	  different	  time	  when	  governors	  in	  the	  region	  shared	  common	  concerns	  
about	  federal	  redistributive	  policies	  that	  took	  money	  out	  of	  the	  Northeast,	  and	  then	  
spent	  it	  in	  the	  South	  or	  the	  West.	  	  This	  common	  regional	  quest	  to	  defend	  the	  region,	  
especially	  when	  economic	  conditions	  worsened,	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  Republicans	  and	  
Democrats	  to	  work	  closely	  together	  in	  a	  common	  cause.	  	  When	  many	  of	  these	  regional	  
programs	  were	  abandoned	  federally	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  Appalachian	  Regional	  
Commission)	  it	  became	  more	  difficult	  to	  find	  common	  causes	  capable	  of	  uniting	  
Republicans	  and	  Democrats	  across	  state	  boundaries.	  	  
	  
In	  recent	  years,	  partisan	  differences	  between	  states	  have	  intensified.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  junior	  
people	  in	  governors’	  offices	  have	  tended	  to	  be	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  regional	  file.	  	  	  In	  the	  
current	  era	  of	  increased	  political	  competition	  and	  conflict	  in	  U.S.	  decision-­‐making,	  it	  is	  
hardly	  surprising	  that	  these	  trends	  have	  occurred.	  	  As	  illustrated	  by	  Richard	  Barberio:	  	  
	  
“While	  there	  has	  always	  been	  disagreement	  over	  policy-­‐making	  –	  after	  all,	  such	  
friction	  is	  build	  into	  our	  constitutional	  structure	  by	  choice	  of	  the	  country’s	  
founders	  –	  anecdotal	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  indicates	  we	  are	  living	  in	  a	  era	  of	  
increased	  conflict.	  	  Insider	  accounts	  from	  policy	  makers	  reflecting	  on	  their	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tenures	  in	  Washington	  D.C.,	  for	  example,	  hold	  a	  sustained	  note	  of	  sadness	  for	  
how	  policy	  making	  has	  become	  increasingly	  partisan,	  petty	  and	  vindictive.	  	  
Nostalgia	  for	  the	  “good	  old	  days’’	  that	  may	  never	  have	  existed,	  can	  account	  for	  
some	  of	  these	  pronouncements	  about	  the	  current	  state	  of	  policy-­‐making,	  but	  
the	  data	  from	  our	  chief	  policy-­‐making	  body,	  Congress,	  is	  harder	  to	  dismiss.	  	  The	  
level	  of	  partisanship	  as	  measured	  by	  party	  -­‐	  line	  voting	  has	  increased	  over	  the	  
last	  twenty	  years.	  	  The	  increased	  power	  of	  party	  leaders,	  especially	  the	  Speaker	  
of	  the	  US	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  has	  allowed	  the	  parties	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  
offer	  demands	  rather	  than	  compromises	  about	  the	  substance	  of	  policies;	  the	  
result	  is	  that	  fewer	  major	  bills	  are	  passed	  in	  the	  contemporary	  era	  of	  
Congress.”15	  	  
	  
Part	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  the	  new	  era	  of	  hyper-­‐partisanship	  might	  be	  connected	  with	  
the	  declining	  growth	  rate	  in	  the	  American	  economy	  and	  political	  challenges	  connected	  
with	  fewer	  resources	  to	  share.16	  	  As	  argued	  by	  Lester	  Thurow	  in	  The	  Zero	  Sum	  Society,	  
this	  decline	  in	  growth	  has	  created	  a	  zero	  sum	  competition	  in	  politics	  where	  every	  gain	  is	  
perceived	  as	  having	  to	  come	  by	  imposing	  loss	  on	  someone	  else.	  17	  Recent	  economic	  
decline	  has	  created	  a	  more	  intense	  and	  partisan	  form	  of	  politics	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Moreover,	  
unlike	  the	  period	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  when	  U.S.	  regional	  institutions	  were	  originally	  
formed,	  anti-­‐government	  factions	  are	  no	  longer	  on	  the	  fringe.	  	  They	  are	  at	  the	  very	  
center	  of	  policy	  making	  and	  politics,	  most	  visibly	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  In	  this	  new	  
context,	  it	  is	  more	  difficult,	  from	  a	  political	  perspective,	  to	  expend	  scarce	  time	  and	  
resources	  on	  regionalism.	  	  	  
	  
Such	  competitive	  and	  partisan	  trends	  have	  played	  out	  at	  the	  state	  intergovernmental	  
level	  as	  well.	  	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  controversial	  Maine	  governor	  closely	  affiliated	  with	  the	  
tea	  party	  movement	  18	  in	  this	  new	  era	  of	  hyper-­‐partisan	  competition	  between	  
Republicans	  and	  Democrats	  (federally,	  within	  states,	  and	  locally),	  governors	  have	  found	  
it	  more	  difficult	  to	  play	  the	  regional	  game	  in	  the	  way	  they	  did	  in	  the	  past.19	  	  Here	  too,	  
there	  is	  much	  nostalgia	  for	  the	  “good	  old	  days”	  in	  New	  England	  politics	  when	  governors	  
were	  able	  to	  discuss	  common	  problems	  and	  solutions,	  but	  much	  has	  changed	  since	  
then.	  	  	  
	  
To	  be	  sure,	  the	  fact	  that	  four	  new	  New	  England	  governors	  came	  into	  office	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  in	  January	  2011	  created	  a	  huge	  problem	  for	  the	  regional	  organization.20	  	  Within	  
such	  a	  context,	  there	  was	  little	  opportunity	  for	  bringing	  new	  governors	  into	  the	  regional	  
fold	  and	  building	  the	  kind	  of	  political	  support	  required	  to	  champion	  the	  regional	  cause.	  	  
	  
But	  this	  trend	  may	  have	  been	  coming	  for	  a	  while.	  	  For	  example,	  Governor	  Mitt	  Romney	  
of	  Massachusetts	  was	  known	  as	  “Mr.	  Environment”	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  term.	  	  His	  
staff	  was	  actively	  involved	  in	  encouraging	  state	  and	  climate	  policy	  coordination.	  	  But	  
once	  he	  had	  national	  political	  aspirations,	  the	  governor	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  strong	  regional	  
player.21	  The	  national	  audience	  was	  different	  and	  Romney’s	  message	  or	  brand	  changed	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too.	  	  He	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  national	  scene	  and	  regionalization	  became	  less	  important	  
as	  a	  marketing	  strategy.	  National	  political	  strategy	  trumped	  regional	  policy.	  
	  
This	  loss	  of	  a	  regional	  champion	  hurt	  the	  regional	  cause.	  	  Since	  Massachusetts,	  
comprising	  half	  of	  New	  England's	  population	  and	  serving	  as	  the	  geographic	  core,	  had	  
always	  been	  the	  center	  of	  regionalization,	  comparable	  to	  Brussels	  in	  Belgium,	  it	  
mattered.	  	  Boston	  was	  the	  central	  headquarters,	  where	  all	  the	  action	  was.	  	  Without	  a	  
strong	  defender	  of	  regional	  approaches	  to	  issues	  in	  Boston,	  regional	  cooperation	  began	  
losing	  momentum.	  	  	  This	  change	  over	  time	  was	  reinforced	  as	  increased	  partisanship	  
meant	  that	  Democratic	  and	  Republicans	  alike	  found	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  work	  together	  on	  
key	  policy	  issues.	  	  
	  
There	  remain	  some	  issues	  that	  New	  England	  does	  see	  from	  a	  regional	  perspective,	  but	  
mostly	  in	  terms	  of	  intra-­‐regional	  conflicts	  within	  the	  U.S.	  	  There	  is	  an	  annual	  battle	  in	  
Congress	  to	  cut	  federal	  subsidies	  to	  low	  income	  households	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  heating	  
oil,	  upon	  which	  New	  England	  is	  more	  dependent	  than	  any	  other	  part	  of	  the	  U.S.	  	  The	  
drive	  to	  cut	  the	  subsidies	  comes	  from	  southern	  and	  western	  states	  that	  use	  almost	  no	  
heating	  oil.	  	  It	  is	  resisted	  by	  the	  New	  England	  Congressional	  delegation,	  usually	  with	  
strong	  support	  from	  the	  governors.	  	  	  
	  
There	  was	  also	  a	  recent	  drive	  by	  the	  Governors	  of	  eight	  northeastern	  states	  to	  petition	  
the	  federal	  government	  to	  impose	  more	  stringent	  emissions	  limits	  on	  power	  plant	  
emissions	  from	  southern	  and	  Midwestern	  coal-­‐fired	  generators.	  	  The	  pollutants	  from	  
these	  plants	  travel	  downwind	  to	  the	  northeast	  and	  cause	  air	  quality	  violations.	  	  This	  was	  
the	  first	  major	  regional	  drive	  on	  an	  air	  quality	  issue	  since	  the	  effort	  to	  reduce	  acid	  rain	  
related	  emissions	  in	  1980s,	  which	  involved	  exactly	  the	  same	  actors	  and	  issues,	  with	  one	  
exception.	  
	  
The	  exception	  was	  Maine.	  	  While	  the	  1980s	  fight	  over	  acid	  rain	  involved	  governors	  from	  
both	  parties,	  all	  of	  the	  governors	  who	  signed	  the	  2013	  petition	  to	  EPA	  on	  emissions	  
were	  Democrats.	  	  The	  lone	  holdout	  was	  the	  Republican	  Governor	  of	  Maine,	  Paul	  
LePage.	  	  This	  was	  curious	  since	  Governor	  LePage	  had	  been	  relentless	  in	  complaining	  
about	  Maine's	  relatively	  high	  electricity	  prices.	  	  When	  faced	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
reduce	  that	  price	  differential,	  he	  chose	  to	  stay	  apart	  from	  the	  region	  in	  order	  to	  
preserve	  his	  anti-­‐regulatory	  policy	  preferences.	  	  
	  
Province-­‐building:	  Moving	  South?	  
	  
In	  Canada,	  intergovernmental	  relations	  have	  also	  changed,	  first	  minister’s	  meetings	  are	  
less	  common,	  and	  politics	  often	  trumps	  policy.	  22	  Images	  of	  Danny	  Williams	  taking	  down	  
the	  Canadian	  flag,23	  or	  his	  attack	  on	  New	  Brunswick’s	  deal	  with	  Quebec	  Hydro	  (which	  
was	  scrapped	  after	  this	  political	  spat),	  or	  even	  his	  campaign	  for	  anyone	  but	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Conservatives	  in	  the	  2008	  federal	  election,	  help	  to	  remind	  us	  that	  politics	  has	  become	  
more	  aggressive,	  insular,	  and	  populist	  over	  time.	  	  As	  argued	  by	  Bakvis	  et	  al.,	  “The	  fact	  
that	  executive	  federalism	  is	  the	  norm	  reinforces	  the	  government-­‐to-­‐government	  nature	  
of	  relations	  between	  the	  federal	  and	  provincial	  orders	  and	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  form	  
regionally	  based	  legislative	  coalitions	  that	  cut	  across	  governmental	  jurisdictions.”24	  	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  an	  era	  when	  the	  political	  executive	  has	  become	  more	  powerful	  in	  Canada.	  	  	  By	  
controlling	  when	  parliament	  is	  dissolved	  and	  when	  elections	  are	  called,	  by	  imposing	  
party	  discipline	  on	  Members	  of	  Parliament	  and	  limiting	  resources	  for	  parliamentary	  
committees,	  Canada’s	  executives	  have	  centralized	  their	  power.25	  Since	  these	  executive	  
powers	  exist	  at	  both	  levels	  of	  government	  within	  a	  highly	  decentralized	  and	  competitive	  
federal	  system,	  the	  trends	  towards	  centralization	  reinforce	  each	  other	  at	  the	  different	  
levels	  of	  government	  rather	  than	  providing	  a	  counterbalancing	  effect.	  	  This	  is	  
particularly	  the	  case	  in	  energy	  policy	  where	  evolving	  centralization	  combines	  with	  
provincial	  ownership	  of	  natural	  resources	  to	  make	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  construct	  
regional	  approaches	  to	  energy	  issues.	  But	  this	  Canadian	  brand	  of	  territorial	  competition	  
over	  patterns	  of	  development	  and	  associational	  activity	  has	  moved	  in	  new	  directions	  
with	  the	  rise	  of	  continentalism	  and	  new	  opportunities	  to	  build	  energy	  infrastructure	  
south.	  	  	  	  
	  
To	  fully	  understand	  the	  impacts	  these	  trends	  are	  having	  on	  cross-­‐border	  regionalism,	  we	  
also	  need	  to	  pay	  closer	  attention	  to	  the	  various	  competing	  economic	  interests	  
connected	  with	  these	  dissimilar	  province-­‐building	  regimes,	  and	  the	  impact	  they	  are	  
having	  on	  New	  England	  energy	  politics	  and	  decisions	  regarding	  infrastructure.	  	  These	  
competing	  energy	  interests	  from	  Canada	  are	  playing	  a	  significant	  role	  south	  of	  the	  
border	  in	  shaping	  energy	  infrastructure	  priorities	  and	  building	  support	  south	  of	  the	  
border	  for	  their	  agendas	  through	  partnering	  with	  other	  American	  interests.	  	  	  
	  
Battles	  over	  hydro	  development	  and	  province-­‐building,	  where	  premiers	  pushed	  north-­‐
south	  in	  a	  quest	  to	  gain	  control	  over	  territorial	  boundaries	  and	  spatial	  patterns	  of	  
association,	  began	  in	  Ontario	  in	  the	  1920s,	  and	  spread	  to	  BC,	  Quebec,	  and	  Manitoba	  
decades	  later.	  	  In	  more	  recent	  times	  these	  battles	  have	  moved	  away	  from	  the	  north,	  and	  
are	  creeping	  gradually	  south	  into	  the	  United	  States.26	  	  Free	  trade	  and	  de-­‐regulation	  have	  
simply	  created	  opportunities	  to	  move	  in	  new	  directions.	  	  Each	  province	  relied	  upon	  
competing	  province-­‐building	  initiatives	  to	  open	  up	  frontiers,	  build	  communities,	  and	  
mobilize	  powerful	  public	  –	  private	  coalitions	  necessary	  for	  survival.	  	  Province-­‐building	  
did	  survive,	  despite	  threats	  posed	  by	  modernization	  and	  calls	  for	  a	  more	  creative	  form	  
of	  politics.	  	  	  
	  
None	  of	  this	  is	  new.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  provincial	  autonomy	  trumped	  sound	  economic	  advice	  
coming	  from	  experts,	  but	  all	  of	  this	  was	  reinforced	  by	  a	  combined	  cabinet-­‐parliamentary	  
and	  federal	  system	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  premiers	  to	  hide	  the	  real	  costs	  associated	  
with	  building	  competing	  north-­‐south	  transportation	  and	  energy	  systems.27	  	  This	  history	  
is	  not	  well	  understood	  on	  the	  U.S.	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  Nor	  is	  there	  a	  full	  appreciation	  of	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the	  competitive	  nature	  of	  infrastructure	  development	  north	  of	  the	  border,	  and	  what	  
this	  may	  mean	  with	  respect	  to	  future	  energy	  costs.	  	  Clearly,	  given	  the	  level	  of	  growing	  
energy	  interdependence	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  those	  affected	  
(governments,	  citizens,	  and	  consumers)	  are	  well	  informed	  and	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  
forces	  that	  shape	  policy	  actions	  and	  patterns	  of	  decision-­‐making	  north	  of	  the	  border.	  	  	  
	  
This	  is	  where	  the	  price	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  regional	  approaches	  and	  institutions	  like	  the	  New	  
England	  Governors	  Conference	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  paid.	  In	  an	  era	  when	  governments	  are	  
under	  closer	  scrutiny	  and	  politics	  has	  become	  more	  partisan,	  volatile,	  and	  competitive,	  
there	  has	  been	  less	  enthusiasm	  for	  open	  government	  or	  sharing	  information.	  	  The	  loss	  
of	  any	  organization	  that	  had	  an	  express	  mission	  to	  reduce	  partisanship	  and	  provide	  
open	  communications	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  keenly	  felt.	  	  The	  NEGC	  was	  more	  public	  than	  
CONEG,	  which	  is	  more	  informal,	  and	  invisible	  to	  the	  media	  and	  public.	  	  
	  
For	  decades	  there	  were	  always	  arguments	  that	  having	  both	  CONEG	  and	  NEGC	  was	  
unnecessary	  and	  redundant.	  	  They	  tried	  to	  carve	  out	  distinctive	  paths	  –	  CONEG	  with	  
transportation	  and	  lobbying	  in	  Washington	  	  and	  NEGC	  with	  energy,	  environment,	  and	  
Canada.28	  	  But	  in	  bad	  economic	  times,	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  fund	  two	  groups	  got	  pushed	  
onto	  the	  agenda.	  	  CONEG	  lost	  states	  over	  the	  years	  (New	  Jersey	  and	  Pennsylvania	  
dropped	  out).	  	  But	  ironically,	  by	  losing	  members,	  the	  organization	  gained	  advantages	  in	  
the	  struggle	  for	  survival.	  	  
	  
Originally,	  there	  were	  plans	  for	  consolidating	  CONEG	  into	  the	  New	  England	  organization,	  
but	  these	  plans	  were	  reversed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  lobbying	  from	  certain	  officials	  in	  DC.29	  	  The	  
plan	  changed	  and	  it	  resulted	  in	  the	  integrating	  of	  the	  old	  NEGC	  into	  the	  more	  informal	  
Coalition.	  	  But,	  despite	  appearances,	  the	  resources	  paying	  for	  the	  office	  continued	  to	  
come	  from	  the	  NEGC,	  and	  not	  from	  New	  York.	  	  New	  York	  has	  never	  had	  much	  interest	  in	  
working	  closely	  with	  other	  governors.	  	  It	  refused	  to	  pay	  anything	  for	  the	  new	  
organization.	  	  
	  
The	  decision	  to	  partner	  with	  New	  York	  brought	  benefits	  as	  well	  as	  risks.	  	  There	  was	  
pressure	  to	  bring	  state	  issues	  more	  effectively	  onto	  the	  national	  stage	  where	  New	  York	  
could	  be	  a	  powerful	  ally	  or	  at	  least	  help	  create	  that	  impression	  for	  the	  public.	  	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  there	  were	  risks	  associated	  with	  partnering	  with	  New	  York,	  since	  that	  state	  
is	  so	  powerful,	  and	  does	  not	  have	  a	  tradition	  of	  working	  closely	  with	  New	  England,	  
which	  it	  sees	  as	  a	  competitor,	  or	  with	  other	  states	  involved	  with	  the	  Council	  of	  States.	  	  
New	  York	  has	  a	  tradition	  of	  operating	  on	  its	  own.	  	  There	  are	  no	  signs	  that	  will	  change	  in	  
the	  future.	  	  	  
	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  new	  coalition	  of	  governors	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  the	  
Eastern	  Premiers,	  where	  Quebec	  is	  the	  big	  player,	  and	  there	  is	  much	  competition	  over	  
policy	  issues	  (energy,	  markets,	  infrastructure,	  and	  even	  political	  boundaries).	  	  But	  in	  
Canada,	  the	  competition	  is	  less	  about	  partisanship	  than	  about	  provincial	  governments	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defending	  and	  promoting	  their	  territorial	  and	  jurisdictional	  interests.	  	  These	  competitive	  
tendencies	  have	  continued	  throughout	  the	  life	  of	  this	  intergovernmental	  organization.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  clear	  evidence	  that	  it	  was	  the	  New	  England	  governors	  who	  decided	  that	  the	  
status	  quo	  was	  no	  longer	  an	  option.	  	  	  They	  pulled	  the	  plug	  on	  the	  NEGC	  and	  moved	  
operations	  to	  DC	  (under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  CONEG).	  	  	  
	  
The	  new	  regional	  game	  included	  New	  York,	  but	  the	  new	  system	  had	  less	  policy	  capacity,	  
and	  was	  less	  formal.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  regional	  game	  changed	  in	  a	  significant	  way,	  there	  
was	  a	  deliberate	  strategy	  to	  create	  the	  impression	  that	  nothing	  had,	  in	  fact,	  changed.30	  	  
There	  was	  no	  public	  announcement	  about	  laying	  off	  staff	  in	  New	  England	  and	  shutting	  
down	  the	  NEGC	  office	  in	  Boston.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  Eastern	  Premiers	  were	  told	  that	  the	  
New	  England	  Governors	  wanted	  to	  continue	  the	  relationship	  that	  began	  in	  1973,	  and	  
this	  would	  simply	  be	  managed	  by	  the	  new	  Coalition	  in	  DC.	  	  But	  things	  had	  changed	  in	  a	  
fundamental	  way,	  and	  further,	  the	  Eastern	  Premiers	  were	  told	  to	  say	  nothing,	  keep	  out	  
of	  the	  debate,	  and	  not	  to	  interfere	  in	  a	  New	  England	  decision.31	  	  
	  
With	  these	  changes,	  it	  was	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  New	  England	  
Governors-­‐Eastern	  Canadian	  Premiers	  in	  Halifax	  ended	  up	  within	  a	  year,	  cutting	  
members	  of	  their	  staff	  who	  were	  responsible	  for	  dealing	  with	  the	  New	  England	  file.	  	  The	  
game	  had	  changed	  and	  the	  premiers	  had	  little	  choice	  but	  to	  adjust.	  
	  
It	  is	  a	  regional	  game	  that	  has	  become	  more	  bilateral,	  competitive,	  insular,	  and	  
disconnected	  from	  the	  public.	  	  Gone	  are	  the	  days	  when	  meetings	  were	  quickly	  arranged	  
within	  New	  England,	  where	  everyone	  is	  three	  hours	  apart	  in	  travel	  time.	  	  Gone	  too	  are	  
the	  mechanisms	  and	  processes	  that	  regional	  committees	  in	  energy,	  environment,	  and	  
other	  issues	  gathered	  and	  reported.	  	  In	  fact,	  discussions	  now	  tend	  to	  involve	  utilities	  
themselves.	  	  There	  is	  much	  less	  opportunity	  for	  good	  governance	  where	  different	  
interests	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  come	  together	  and	  form	  common	  ideas,	  objectives,	  and	  
strategies.32	  	  With	  New	  York	  part	  of	  the	  mix,	  there	  are	  new	  challenges	  associated	  with	  
getting	  everyone	  to	  work	  together,	  and	  pulling	  in	  the	  same	  direction.	  	  Ideas	  of	  
community,	  interests,	  and	  institutional	  traditions	  have	  changed	  in	  a	  significant	  way.	  	  	  
	  
While	  the	  New	  England	  polity	  and	  system	  of	  intergovernmental	  relations	  has	  historically	  
been	  much	  more	  open	  and	  transparent,	  especially	  when	  compared	  to	  Canadian	  
provincial	  regimes,	  the	  New	  England	  governors	  appear	  to	  have	  learned	  much	  from	  their	  
Eastern	  Premier	  counterparts,	  where	  there	  is	  more	  of	  a	  tradition	  of	  meeting	  behind	  
closed	  doors	  and	  letting	  experts	  rule.33	  	  We	  need	  to	  recognize	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  U.S.	  
patterns	  of	  intergovernmental	  relations	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  movement	  towards	  more	  closed	  
door	  meetings	  and	  private	  receptions	  with	  sponsors	  (which	  it	  is	  argued	  government	  can	  
no	  longer	  pay	  for).34	  	  	  
	  
For	  instance,	  the	  New	  England	  States	  Committee	  on	  Electricity	  (NESCOE)	  was	  originally	  
created	  by	  the	  NEGC	  but	  operated	  as	  a	  subsidiary.35	  In	  2011	  it	  was	  decided	  to	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incorporate	  NESCOE	  into	  a	  separate	  entity.36	  	  NESCOE	  was	  originally	  designed	  as	  a	  
governors’	  regional	  planning	  organization	  representing	  broad	  policy	  interests	  and	  
networks	  –	  energy	  policy	  directors,	  regulators,	  governors’	  office	  policy	  staff,	  
environmental	  commissioners,	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  things	  changed.	  	  In	  the	  current	  
institutional	  arrangement,	  managers	  are	  basically	  all	  from	  the	  regulatory	  (i.e.	  Public	  
Utilities	  Commission)	  sector,	  though	  Connecticut	  with	  its	  agency	  structure	  essentially	  
has	  joint	  regulatory/policy	  responsibilities.	  In	  practice,	  the	  reformed	  NESCOE	  represents	  
a	  narrow	  regulatory	  policy	  perspective	  that	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  broader	  energy	  
policy	  network	  of	  the	  past.37	  Its	  members	  are	  more	  akin	  to	  the	  New	  England	  Council	  of	  
Public	  Utility	  Commissioners	  (NECPUC).	  	  NESCOE	  is	  playing	  the	  insiders	  game,	  but	  a	  
regional	  vision	  or	  argument	  is	  lacking.	  	  
	  
In	  DC,	  there	  is	  hope	  that	  the	  CONEG	  can	  manage	  regional	  issues	  effectively	  without	  a	  
hiccup.	  	  But	  there	  is	  a	  learning	  curve,	  issues	  of	  familiarity	  with	  issues	  and	  players,	  as	  well	  
as	  challenges	  with	  addressing	  both	  New	  England	  and	  New	  York	  issues.	  	  The	  organization	  
may	  have	  the	  appropriate	  skills	  sets	  or	  competencies,	  but	  it	  will	  take	  a	  long	  time	  to	  
recreate	  the	  connections	  that	  old	  NEGC	  had.	  	  There	  will	  be	  further	  challenges	  associated	  
with	  creating	  trust,	  especially	  given	  the	  increasing	  competition	  between	  the	  states	  and	  
the	  outlier	  status	  of	  New	  York.	  For	  the	  governors,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  premiers	  involved,	  there	  
are	  new	  considerations	  with	  DC	  as	  a	  central	  location.	  	  States	  such	  as	  Maine	  and	  New	  
Hampshire	  do	  not	  even	  have	  offices	  in	  DC.	  	  Massachusetts,	  Rhode	  Island,	  and	  
Connecticut	  are	  already	  set	  up	  to	  play	  the	  more	  competitive	  and	  more	  bilateral	  game.	  	  	  
	  
Another	  important	  issue	  in	  this	  change	  involves	  patterns	  of	  problem	  definition	  and	  
agenda	  setting.	  	  CONGEG	  has	  always	  been	  focused	  on	  transportation	  issues	  such	  as	  rail	  
and	  engaged	  with	  lobbying	  for	  federal	  funding	  for	  the	  northeast,	  not	  regional	  policy	  
development.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  NEGC	  and	  NEG/ECP	  were	  fundamentally	  policy	  
and	  programmatic	  institutions	  focusing	  within	  the	  region	  across	  a	  broader	  array	  of	  
issues.	  	  	  
	  
On	  this	  score,	  the	  NEG/ECP	  was	  an	  internationally	  recognized	  policy	  development	  
institute	  on	  energy	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  organization.	  It	  also	  offered	  the	  
world’s	  first	  multi-­‐jurisdictional	  climate	  action	  plan,	  a	  mercury	  program	  that	  became	  the	  
basis	  for	  the	  North	  American	  Accord	  on	  Mercury,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  international	  
initiatives.	  	  The	  old	  organization	  provided	  a	  unique	  regional	  policy	  and	  program	  
development	  program	  that	  will	  be	  missed.	  	  It	  may	  not	  have	  been	  the	  annual	  meetings	  of	  
the	  NEG/ECP	  that	  were	  meaningful.	  	  Rather,	  it	  was	  the	  policy/program	  work	  that	  
occurred	  between	  them	  with	  hundreds	  of	  governmental,	  NGO,	  and	  private-­‐sector	  actors	  
and	  networks	  that	  mattered	  most.	  	  It	  is	  the	  regional	  capacity	  and	  opportunities	  to	  bring	  
different	  interests	  together	  and	  devise	  common	  objectives	  and	  solutions	  that	  have	  been	  
lost	  and	  will	  be	  missed.	  	  	  
	  
As	  for	  the	  Eastern	  Premiers,	  the	  game	  has	  also	  changed	  and	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  clear	  
winners	  and	  losers.	  	  Atlantic	  Canada	  does	  not	  exist	  on	  the	  radar	  screen	  in	  DC.	  	  There	  are	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no	  provincial	  offices	  or	  representatives	  in	  the	  U.S.	  capital	  even	  though	  Quebec,	  Alberta,	  
Ontario,	  and	  even	  Manitoba	  (which	  has	  a	  representative	  for	  Hydro)	  all	  have	  a	  presence	  
in	  Washington.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  Atlantic	  premiers	  have	  concentrated	  more	  on	  bi-­‐lateral	  
relations	  throughout	  the	  New	  England	  states,	  and	  relied	  on	  the	  New	  England	  –	  Canada	  
Business	  Council,	  personal	  relationships,	  trade	  shows,	  discussions	  carried	  out	  between	  
companies,	  utilities,	  the	  occasional	  hiring	  of	  short-­‐term	  representatives	  and	  the	  like	  to	  
push	  their	  agendas.	  	  These	  were	  never	  well-­‐coordinated	  or	  integrated	  projects	  across	  
provinces	  and	  states.	  	  Quebec	  has	  always	  enjoyed	  a	  stronger	  presence	  both	  on	  the	  
ground	  and	  in	  individual	  states,	  but	  also	  in	  DC	  and	  New	  York.38	  	  It	  would	  difficult	  for	  any	  
governor	  to	  ignore	  Quebec’s	  political	  clout.39	  	  
	  
In	  the	  new	  regional	  game,	  the	  Atlantic	  premiers,	  Maine,	  and	  New	  Hampshire,	  may	  need	  
to	  rethink	  their	  strategies	  as	  agenda-­‐setting	  takes	  place	  in	  D.C.	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  playing	  out	  
the	  regional	  game	  in	  both	  the	  region	  and	  national	  capital	  may	  not	  be	  cheaper	  at	  all.	  	  But	  
it	  is	  a	  game	  dominated	  by	  bigger	  interests	  and	  states	  that	  are	  more	  informal,	  outside	  
the	  public	  view,	  and	  increasingly	  competitive.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  new	  game,	  politics	  seems	  to	  trump	  good	  regional	  governance.	  	  There	  are	  signs	  
everywhere	  that	  these	  battles	  are	  heating	  up.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  2013	  meetings	  of	  the	  
NEGC/EP	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Quebec,	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  get	  everyone	  to	  attend.	  	  Were	  it	  
not	  for	  the	  lobbying	  efforts	  of	  the	  Quebec	  government,	  in	  particular,	  it	  might	  have	  been	  
a	  disaster.40	  	  In	  the	  end,	  all	  six	  governors	  showed	  up,	  general	  resolutions	  were	  passed,	  
and	  they	  managed	  to	  keep	  the	  myth	  going	  that	  it	  was	  business	  as	  usual.	  	  Whether	  this	  
can	  be	  done	  for	  the	  next	  meetings	  in	  New	  Hampshire,	  only	  time	  will	  tell.	  	  As	  indicated	  
above,	  Quebec	  with	  all	  its	  energy	  and	  connections	  with	  New	  England	  is	  a	  special	  case.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  certainly	  not	  a	  good	  time	  for	  regional	  cooperation.	  	  On	  the	  energy	  front,	  several	  
battles	  have	  heated	  up	  with	  competing	  efforts	  to	  create	  new	  patterns	  of	  association.	  	  	  
While	  there	  is	  discussion	  about	  a	  possible	  new	  regional	  energy	  agenda	  in	  New	  England,	  
there	  are	  now	  significant	  divisions	  between	  the	  states	  in	  their	  roles	  as	  both	  consumers	  
and	  producers	  of	  electricity.	  	  All	  of	  the	  states	  in	  the	  Northeast	  have	  adopted	  Renewable	  
Portfolio	  Standards	  to	  encourage	  the	  growth	  of	  renewable	  electricity	  generation	  from	  
old	  sources	  such	  as	  hydro	  and	  new	  sources	  such	  as	  wind	  by	  requiring	  utilities	  to	  make	  a	  
percentage	  of	  total	  generation	  come	  from	  these	  sources.	  	  But	  there	  are	  no	  common	  
rules	  on	  what	  qualifies	  as	  renewable	  energy	  within	  each	  state’s	  standards.41	  Within	  
states,	  there	  are	  competing	  forms	  of	  energy	  planning	  as	  competing	  interests	  pressure	  
for	  their	  agendas	  and	  solutions.42	  	  	  
	  
In	  Vermont,	  for	  example,	  with	  its	  close	  alliance	  and	  dependence	  on	  electricity	  from	  
Quebec,	  there	  is	  a	  different	  set	  of	  rules	  for	  energy	  exchange.	  	  Hydro	  is	  considered	  green.	  	  
Connecticut	  appears	  open	  to	  such	  an	  approach,	  but	  there	  is	  resistance	  within	  
Massachusetts,	  New	  Hampshire	  and	  Maine	  where	  rules	  about	  which	  electricity	  meets	  
renewable	  portfolio	  standards	  favor	  wind	  generators	  within	  the	  state	  rather	  than	  Hydro	  
Quebec.	  	  Maine,	  for	  example,	  excludes	  generators	  over	  100	  MW	  from	  qualifying	  for	  RPS	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qualifications.	  	  In	  a	  peculiar	  cross-­‐border	  twist,	  this	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  promoting	  wind	  
power	  development	  by	  Calgary-­‐based	  Trans	  Canada	  in	  competition	  with	  Hydro	  Quebec	  
and	  potential	  power	  from	  Labrador.	  	  New	  Hampshire	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  British	  
Columbia	  (a	  pipeline	  debate43)	  and	  it	  sees	  little	  value	  in	  simply	  being	  a	  conduit	  for	  
transporting	  power	  to	  Connecticut.44	  Many	  of	  these	  battles	  over	  energy	  security	  and	  
desire	  to	  defend	  and	  promote	  province-­‐building	  through	  hydro	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  
infrastructural	  development	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border	  are	  not	  being	  resolved	  or	  
discussed	  in	  policy	  terms,	  nor	  are	  there	  integrated	  structures	  to	  bring	  different	  interests	  
together	  in	  ways	  to	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  produce	  common	  mental	  maps	  and	  shared	  
objectives.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  a	  risky	  game	  and	  political	  gamble	  for	  Canadian	  premiers.	  	  The	  energy	  supply	  
picture	  has	  changed	  a	  great	  deal	  since	  the	  early	  1970s	  when	  the	  Governor	  of	  Maine,	  Ken	  
Curtis,	  appealed	  directly	  to	  K.C	  Irving	  to	  send	  down	  truck	  loads	  of	  oil	  to	  keep	  the	  Great	  
Northern	  Paper	  Mill	  in	  operation.	  	  Today	  New	  England	  is	  not	  only	  the	  major	  potential	  
market	  for	  Canadian	  energy,	  particularly	  hydro,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  major	  potential	  competitor.	  	  
The	  renewable	  portfolio	  standards	  in	  each	  state	  plus	  major	  shifts	  in	  technology	  of	  wind	  
generation	  mean	  that	  New	  England	  can	  now	  meet	  much	  of	  its	  own	  needs	  with	  its	  own	  
resources	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  19th	  Century.	  	  Maine	  alone	  has	  about	  500	  MW	  
installed	  now,	  with	  another	  500	  MW	  easily	  developable	  onshore	  and	  another	  2000	  MW	  
possible	  offshore.	  Massachusetts	  and	  New	  Hampshire	  can	  probably	  build	  half	  as	  much	  
as	  Maine.	  	  Only	  Vermont,	  with	  its	  long-­‐term	  commitment	  to	  Quebec,	  will	  be	  a	  minor	  
player	  in	  wind.	  	  Connecticut	  and	  Rhode	  Island	  will	  probably	  benefit	  from	  offshore	  wind	  
development	  off	  New	  Jersey	  and	  the	  Delmarva	  Peninsula.	  	  	  	  
	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  each	  state	  also	  knows	  that	  despite	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  RPS	  policies	  and	  
objectives,	  there	  remain	  uncertainties	  about	  whether	  these	  targets	  can	  be	  met.	  	  Wind	  
energy,	  which	  has	  played	  the	  leading	  role	  in	  a	  new	  indigenous	  energy	  supply	  for	  New	  
England,	  remains	  hugely	  controversial	  with	  neighbors	  every	  time	  a	  new	  project	  is	  
proposed.	  	  	  Importing	  hydropower	  from	  Canada	  is	  seen,	  by	  some,	  as	  providing	  a	  
practical	  option	  if	  these	  alternative	  forms	  of	  energy	  technology	  do	  not	  pan	  out	  
politically	  or	  economically.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  kinds	  of	  energy	  challenges	  are	  being	  
addressing	  in	  separate	  competitive	  state	  silos,	  with	  competing	  rules,	  technologies,	  
ideas,	  interests,	  and	  institutional	  actors	  has	  not	  helped	  the	  regional	  cause.	  	  But	  it	  does	  
help	  explain	  why	  all	  six	  New	  England	  governors	  would	  show	  up	  for	  meetings	  in	  Quebec.	  	  	  
Clearly,	  none	  of	  these	  governors	  wants	  to	  lose	  access	  to	  Canada’s	  hydropower	  in	  this	  
competitive	  political	  game.	  It	  is	  a	  risky	  situation	  for	  everyone	  south	  of	  the	  border.	  	  
	  
In	  Canada,	  these	  battles	  over	  energy	  and	  competing	  visions	  of	  province-­‐building	  have	  
intensified	  over	  recent	  years.	  	  In	  NL,	  for	  example,	  Muskrat	  Falls	  has	  appeared	  on	  the	  
scene.	  	  Much	  focus	  is	  placed	  on	  getting	  back	  at	  Quebec	  by	  gaining	  control	  over	  future	  
patterns	  of	  association.	  	  Launched	  by	  former	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  premier,	  
Danny	  Williams,	  Muskrat	  Falls	  was	  designed	  to	  promote	  provincial	  power	  and	  
independence.	  	  From	  the	  start,	  the	  proposal	  has	  raised	  all	  kinds	  of	  questions	  about	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costs.	  	  But	  much	  of	  this	  debate	  has	  been	  stifled.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  public	  has	  pressured	  
for	  more	  information	  and	  independent	  assessment.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  activities	  of	  
NALCOR	  and	  the	  Muskrat	  Falls	  project	  have	  been	  criticized	  for	  not	  providing	  sufficient	  
information	  for	  the	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  in	  NL,	  which	  is	  responsible	  for	  defending	  
the	  public	  interest.45	  	  Legislation	  has	  been	  passed	  to	  control	  public	  access	  to	  
information.46	  	  This	  debate	  recalls	  the	  actions	  of	  W.A.C.	  Bennett	  and	  his	  control	  over	  
province-­‐building	  through	  physical	  infrastructural	  development,	  as	  witnessed	  in	  British	  
Columbia	  between	  1952	  and	  1972.47	  	  	  
	  
The	  Muskrat	  falls	  project	  involves	  a	  partnership	  with	  the	  Nova	  Scotian	  power	  company	  
Emera.	  	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  reduce	  the	  overall	  risk	  or	  costs	  for	  energy	  consumers	  in	  NL.	  	  
While	  it	  is	  a	  partnership,	  each	  government	  plays	  to	  different	  audiences,	  and	  it	  perhaps	  is	  
not	  surprising	  that	  Nova	  Scotia’s	  utility	  has	  attempted	  to	  set	  new	  conditions.	  	  These	  new	  
conditions	  would	  work	  in	  Nova	  Scotia’s	  favor	  and	  provide	  more	  power	  for	  its	  own	  
province-­‐building	  ambitions.	  	  But	  a	  new	  majority	  government	  in	  Nova	  Scotia	  that	  has	  
been	  critical	  of	  Muskrat	  Falls	  and	  is	  determined	  to	  get	  a	  better	  deal	  for	  that	  province,	  
based	  on	  the	  new	  recommendations,	  shows	  that	  inter-­‐provincial	  competition	  over	  
energy	  remains	  active	  even	  in	  projects	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  cooperative.	  
	  
Since	  Nova	  Scotia	  has	  other	  energy	  sources	  and	  objectives,	  there	  are	  clear	  signs	  that	  the	  
province	  hopes	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  U.S.	  market	  through	  other	  partnerships	  for	  its	  
own	  benefit.	  	  For	  example,	  Emera	  has	  bought	  utilities	  in	  Maine,	  and	  is	  very	  active	  in	  
promoting	  its	  own	  provincial	  priorities	  within	  that	  state.	  	  There	  are	  clear	  signs	  in	  Atlantic	  
Canada,	  Quebec,	  Alberta,	  and	  other	  provinces	  to	  promote	  province-­‐building	  ambitions	  
south	  of	  the	  border	  through	  energy	  infrastructural	  development.	  All	  of	  this	  has	  become	  
very	  complicated.	  	  There	  would	  be	  great	  benefits	  to	  bringing	  these	  different	  interests	  
together,	  coordinating	  policies,	  and	  finding	  new	  ways	  to	  move	  in	  a	  common	  direction,	  
not	  working	  at	  cross-­‐purposes.	  	  
	  
In	  New	  Brunswick,	  there	  have	  been	  separate	  talks	  involving	  that	  province,	  Maine,	  and	  
Irving	  Oil	  over	  the	  idea	  of	  building	  their	  own	  energy	  corridor.	  	  These	  bilateral	  
negotiations	  include	  discussions	  over	  shipping	  natural	  gas,	  hydropower,	  and	  other	  
sources	  of	  energy	  through	  new	  infrastructure.48	  	  Maine	  has	  even	  agreed	  to	  give	  up	  land	  
for	  such	  a	  project.	  	  The	  land	  in	  question	  is	  the	  median	  strip	  on	  I-­‐95,	  which	  would	  be	  
leased	  at	  very	  low	  rates	  to	  the	  corridor	  operator.	  	  	  
	  
Environmentalists	  have	  also	  suggested	  a	  need	  for	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  restrictions	  on	  the	  
kinds	  of	  energy	  development	  permitted	  in	  the	  region.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  recent	  local	  
referendum,	  citizen	  groups	  promoted	  an	  ordinance	  to	  prevent	  any	  pipeline	  that	  would	  
bring	  tar	  sands	  oil	  from	  Alberta	  through	  the	  state.49	  	  In	  Vermont,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
regulators	  have	  reacted	  by	  invoking	  new	  powers	  to	  ensure	  that	  any	  new	  diversions	  in	  
pipeline	  flow	  would	  require	  a	  new	  land-­‐use	  permit.	  	  New	  Brunswick’s	  recent	  protests	  
over	  “fracking”	  that	  featured	  clashes	  between	  protesters	  and	  the	  Royal	  Canadian	  
Mounted	  Police,	  the	  blocking	  of	  public	  highways,	  and	  the	  burning	  of	  several	  police	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cruisers	  offer	  clear	  signs	  that	  there	  is	  growing	  public	  frustration	  with	  current	  insular	  
approaches	  to	  energy	  decision-­‐making.50	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  processes	  capable	  of	  bringing	  different	  interests	  together	  to	  share	  
concerns	  and	  knowledge,	  those	  with	  different	  ideas	  and	  interests	  have	  operated	  in	  
competitive	  silos.	  	  None	  of	  this	  has	  been	  good	  for	  democracy.	  	  It	  is	  no	  accident	  that	  the	  
RCMP	  in	  New	  Brunswick	  are	  suggesting	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  defuse	  these	  kinds	  of	  clashes	  
and	  invent	  new	  processes	  for	  resolving	  differences	  that	  are	  nonviolent	  	  and	  capable	  of	  
bringing	  different	  interests	  together	  in	  a	  collaborative	  fashion.	  	  In	  the	  current	  context,	  
there	  is	  a	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  need	  to	  find	  new	  ways	  to	  work	  together	  on	  energy	  
issues,	  but	  this	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  accomplish	  without	  changes	  in	  governance.	  	  
	  
Irving	  is	  just	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  powerful	  companies	  jockeying	  for	  position.	  	  They	  are	  
now	  considering	  different	  forms	  of	  energy	  exchange	  and	  transportation,	  including	  rail,	  
hydro,	  and	  gas.	  	  It	  is	  a	  good	  time	  for	  energy	  companies	  seeking	  new	  ways	  to	  expand,	  
diversify,	  and	  make	  a	  profit.	  	  	  For	  example,	  on	  August	  1,	  2013,	  Irving	  and	  Trans	  
Mountain	  Pipeline	  announced	  that	  they	  have	  partnered	  to	  build	  a	  new	  Marine	  Terminal	  
in	  Saint	  John,	  New	  Brunswick.	  	  But	  there	  is	  also	  talk	  about	  possibly	  building	  an	  oil	  
pipeline	  if	  conditions	  allow.51	  	  
	  
With	  deregulation,	  the	  New	  England	  states	  have	  welcomed	  foreign	  investment,	  and	  
competing	  energy	  interests	  are	  actively	  involved	  in	  a	  race	  to	  the	  south.	  	  Irving	  Oil,	  
Emera,	  and	  Fortis	  (a	  NL	  company)	  are	  buying	  up	  and	  bidding	  on	  competing	  systems	  of	  
energy	  delivery.	  	  As	  one	  would	  expect,	  these	  economic	  interests	  are	  acting	  to	  bring	  
benefits	  to	  their	  own	  individual	  companies	  and	  provinces.	  	  From	  where	  they	  sit,	  it	  
makes	  sense	  for	  market	  actors	  to	  play	  the	  game	  this	  way,	  since	  they	  do	  not	  set	  the	  
rules.	  	  Unless	  or	  until	  there	  are	  new	  common	  rules	  defining	  core	  objectives,	  these	  forces	  
will	  compete	  for	  advantage.	  	  In	  an	  era	  when	  infrastructural	  development	  has	  been	  used	  
to	  stimulate	  the	  economy	  and	  sustain	  it	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  US-­‐Canadian	  border,	  it	  is	  
little	  wonder	  that	  competitive	  companies	  and	  provinces	  alike	  are	  seeking	  advantages.	  	  
As	  these	  companies	  and	  provinces	  operate	  in	  competitive	  silos,	  with	  no	  one	  overseeing	  
the	  overall	  game,	  costs	  to	  consumers	  and	  environmental	  considerations	  treated	  on	  a	  
piecemeal	  basis	  will	  remain	  as	  fragmented	  as	  the	  project	  proposals	  themselves.	  	  These	  
kinds	  of	  public	  policy	  questions	  cannot	  be	  addressed	  without	  good	  governance	  and	  a	  
better	  understanding	  of	  complex	  patterns	  of	  interdependence	  that	  matter	  and	  affect	  
policy	  outcomes.	  	  	  
	  
From	  a	  political	  standpoint,	  Quebec	  has	  learned	  to	  play	  this	  game	  very	  well,	  and	  is	  well	  
positioned	  to	  compete	  and	  control	  patterns	  of	  energy	  transportation	  and	  infrastructural	  
development	  south	  of	  the	  border.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  Vermont,	  a	  Quebec	  company	  
recently	  outbid	  Fortis	  for	  control	  over	  a	  utility.52	  Quebec	  has	  established	  close	  
connections	  with	  government	  and	  industry	  in	  DC	  and	  New	  England.	  	  It	  is	  a	  strong	  
competitor	  with	  much	  knowledge	  and	  capacity.	  	  But	  rather	  than	  Canadian	  and	  Quebec	  
interests	  working	  closely	  with	  their	  US	  counterparts	  across	  states	  and	  energy	  sectors	  to	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come	  up	  with	  a	  common	  energy	  vision	  or	  set	  of	  shared	  objectives	  that	  would	  produce	  
good	  outcomes	  for	  everyone,	  we	  are	  seeing	  more	  silo-­‐based	  competition	  than	  efforts	  to	  
coordinate	  and	  integrate	  across	  systems	  based	  on	  common	  policies.	  	  
	  
Viewed	  this	  way,	  in	  the	  game	  that	  now	  exists,	  it	  was	  only	  logical	  that	  Fortis	  would	  
respond	  by	  purchasing	  CH	  Energy	  Group,	  a	  New	  York	  energy	  delivery	  company,	  which	  
deals	  with	  electric	  power	  and	  natural	  gas.53	  From	  the	  company’s	  perspective,	  the	  
bottom	  line	  is	  making	  a	  profit,	  and	  not	  worrying	  over	  whether	  energy	  infrastructure	  is	  
being	  designed	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  general	  public.	  	  That	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  
government,	  and	  in	  the	  current	  context,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  interest	  in	  creating	  new	  
common	  regional	  rules,	  knowledge	  or	  cross-­‐border	  mechanisms	  with	  capacity.	  	  Rather,	  
under	  the	  current	  system,	  companies	  need	  government	  regulatory	  approval	  at	  the	  state	  
level.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  must	  show	  that	  their	  plans	  are	  cost-­‐effective	  and	  meet	  
environmental	  codes	  defined	  by	  state	  laws.	  We	  operate	  in	  an	  era	  when	  many	  cross-­‐
border	  issues	  are	  being	  driven	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  or	  the	  quasi-­‐private	  sector	  of	  the	  
provincial	  energy	  companies	  that	  tend	  to	  be	  outside	  the	  public	  view.	  	  
	  
When	  you	  add	  the	  actions	  of	  Alberta	  public/private	  interests	  (Trans	  Canada)	  that	  are	  
very	  much	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  seeking	  control	  over	  energy	  infrastructural	  patterns,	  there	  
is	  much	  going	  on	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  sorted	  out,	  but	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  less	  political,	  and	  on	  
the	  public	  radar	  screen.	  	  	  Once	  energy	  infrastructure	  is	  built,	  it	  will	  be	  too	  late	  to	  turn	  
things	  around.	  	  If	  this	  transpires,	  clearly,	  inherited	  physical	  infrastructure	  will	  constrain	  
future	  policy	  actions.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  now	  is	  the	  time	  for	  action,	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  everyone	  
is	  more	  aware	  of	  what	  is	  occurring	  and	  possible	  outcomes.	  	  	  As	  we	  know	  from	  the	  past,	  
once	  powerful	  interests	  become	  embedded	  in	  infrastructure,	  they	  develop	  deep	  roots	  
and	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  future	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  change	  the	  arrangements	  these	  
interests	  have	  benefitted	  from.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  here	  that	  the	  ability	  of	  governments	  in	  New	  England	  and	  eastern	  Canada	  that	  
developed	  over	  the	  past	  decades	  to	  maintain	  regular	  contacts	  and	  communications	  on	  
these	  issues	  will	  be	  most	  missed.	  Recent	  changes	  in	  the	  institutions	  of	  regionalism	  do	  
not	  bode	  well	  for	  those	  seeking	  to	  create	  a	  common	  community	  with	  shared	  values	  and	  
objectives,	  and	  a	  determination	  to	  build	  policy	  capacity	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  interaction	  
and	  integration.	  	  	  
	  
The	  addition	  of	  New	  York	  to	  the	  “region”	  has	  further	  complicated	  matters.	  	  New	  York	  
too	  needs	  power,	  but	  has	  historically	  viewed	  New	  England	  as	  a	  competitor	  for	  Canadian	  
energy.	  	  Quebec	  is	  currently	  making	  plans	  for	  building	  hydro	  infrastructure	  through	  
Ontario,	  and	  down	  through	  to	  the	  state	  of	  New	  York.	  	  All	  of	  this	  infrastructural	  
development	  planning	  is	  occurring	  in	  separate	  silos,	  with	  little	  overall	  discussion	  on	  best	  
practices	  required	  for	  an	  efficient	  system	  of	  energy	  delivery.	  	  Nor	  has	  there	  been	  much	  
opportunity	  to	  discuss	  different	  energy	  sources,	  whether	  gas,	  oil,	  wind,	  or	  tidal	  power,	  
and	  how	  to	  work	  together	  to	  create	  the	  best	  outcomes.	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  various	  
energy	  initiatives	  have	  occurred	  in	  separate,	  competitive	  silos.	  	  Unless	  new	  ways	  are	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found	  to	  bring	  new	  forms	  of	  integration	  and	  interaction	  across	  jurisdictions	  and	  energy	  
sectors	  (wind,	  hydro,	  gas),	  old	  competitive	  forms	  of	  behavior	  will	  continue	  and	  there	  will	  
be	  little	  opportunity	  to	  create	  good	  governance.	  	  	  
	  
To	  be	  sure,	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  there	  is	  little	  appreciation	  of	  province-­‐building,	  battles	  over	  
hydro,	  and	  other	  energy	  sources.	  	  Nor	  is	  there	  knowledge	  of	  how	  these	  competing	  
interests	  are	  seeking	  to	  carve	  out	  infrastructure	  that	  may	  be	  costly	  and	  inefficient.	  	  To	  
make	  matters	  worse,	  there	  is	  little	  appreciation	  of	  how	  these	  competitive	  Canadian	  
jurisdictional-­‐energy	  interests	  may	  be	  creating	  political	  divisions	  “within”	  but	  also	  
“between”	  states.	  	  	  
	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  Canada,	  there	  is	  little	  understanding	  among	  the	  public	  about	  the	  
different	  rules	  for	  green	  energy	  within	  the	  states,	  and	  the	  dynamics	  that	  shape	  decision-­‐
making,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  south	  of	  the	  border.	  	  For	  the	  different	  energy	  sectors	  involved,	  
there	  is	  also	  little	  understanding	  or	  appreciation	  of	  other	  sectors,	  the	  best	  tradeoffs,	  and	  
so	  on.	  	  Regional	  organizations	  that	  examined	  these	  issues	  in	  public	  would	  increase	  
common	  understandings	  of	  the	  complex	  issues	  involved	  in	  energy	  among	  both	  
governments	  and	  the	  public.	  	  Unfortunately,	  recent	  developments	  suggest	  that	  the	  lack	  
of	  such	  organizations	  is	  unlikely	  to	  facilitate	  such	  initiatives.	  	  But	  it	  is	  not	  too	  late,	  since	  
the	  energy	  infrastructure	  has	  not	  been	  built.	  	  It	  is	  a	  time	  for	  better	  regional	  governance.	  	  
	  
The	  controversy	  over	  Muskrat	  Falls	  is	  now	  being	  fought	  out	  in	  the	  courts,	  and	  Quebec	  
and	  NL	  remain	  competitors	  where	  zero	  sum	  conflicts	  appear	  inevitable.	  	  Given	  the	  lack	  
of	  regional	  governance	  institutions	  and	  processes,	  these	  different	  interests	  (whether	  in	  
the	  U.S.	  or	  Canada)	  have	  had	  little	  opportunity	  or	  incentive	  to	  see	  if	  there	  could	  be	  more	  
reasonable	  compromises	  or	  strategies	  for	  producing	  shared	  objectives,	  and	  better	  
outcomes	  for	  all.	  	  But	  without	  these	  games	  in	  place,	  it	  appears	  we	  are	  destined	  for	  
decision-­‐making	  that	  is	  more	  political	  than	  informed	  by	  evidence,	  knowledge,	  and	  
reasonable	  policy	  debate.	  To	  date,	  there	  is	  little	  indication	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  
exchange	  or	  sharing	  that	  tends	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  good	  governance.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Declining	  Role	  of	  Networks	  to	  Sustain	  a	  Regional	  Idea	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  greatest	  mysteries	  surrounding	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  New	  England	  Governors’	  
Conference	  has	  been	  the	  lack	  of	  response	  or	  discussion	  of	  regional	  issues	  among	  its	  
traditional	  boosters.	  	  It	  may	  be	  comparable	  to	  a	  declining	  baseball	  team	  that	  no	  one	  
watched	  or	  longer	  cared	  about	  when	  the	  team	  went	  finally	  belly	  up.	  	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  
New	  England	  Governors’	  Conference	  cut,	  bit	  by	  bit,	  the	  staff	  and	  resources	  essential	  to	  
building	  networks,	  and	  staying	  in	  the	  game.	  	  	  
	  	  
New	  England	  public	  and	  university	  libraries	  are	  full	  of	  historical	  material	  addressing	  the	  
evolution	  and	  desirability	  of	  cross-­‐border	  regionalism.	  	  One	  can	  even	  find	  such	  materials	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in	  New	  York.	  But	  there	  is	  nowhere	  near	  the	  same	  level	  of	  regional	  commentary	  or	  
networks	  today.	  	  In	  the	  current	  era,	  public	  policy	  research	  carried	  out	  by	  traditional	  
supporters	  of	  regionalization	  (such	  as	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  Boston)	  has	  focused	  
more	  attention	  on	  policy	  challenges	  at	  the	  community	  level	  within	  New	  England	  and	  
regionalism,	  to	  the	  extent	  it	  exists.	  	  Mobilizing	  new	  forms	  of	  community	  knowledge	  has	  
been	  a	  central	  focus.	  	  Less	  interest	  and	  fewer	  resources	  are	  available	  for	  focusing	  on	  
formal	  regional	  processes	  and	  assessing	  outcomes	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  	  
	  
The	  context	  has	  changed	  over	  time.	  For	  example,	  attitudes	  about	  government	  planning	  
(regional	  or	  otherwise)	  have	  changed.	  	  New	  Public	  Management	  theories	  and	  practices	  
have	  become	  more	  popular	  and	  old	  policy	  structures	  and	  systems	  of	  rational	  planning	  
have	  been	  questioned.	  	  	  
	  
All	  of	  this	  has	  created	  pressure	  to	  change	  old	  practices	  and	  reduce	  public	  knowledge	  
and	  engagement.	  In	  NL,	  there	  has	  been	  much	  debate	  about	  legislation	  that	  restricts	  
public	  information	  and	  processes,	  which	  are	  more	  inclusive.	  	  There	  has	  also	  been	  much	  
criticism	  about	  reducing	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Public	  Utilities	  Commission	  to	  promote	  
markets	  in	  electric	  power	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  Muskrat	  Falls	  project.	  	  
	  
Similar	  trends	  have	  occurred	  south	  of	  the	  border.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  New	  England	  
Governors’	  Conference	  established	  committees	  with	  their	  own	  networks.	  	  These	  were	  
designed	  to	  bring	  different	  interests	  together,	  and	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  
common	  problems	  and	  to	  resolve	  them	  publicly.	  	  These	  committees	  have	  been	  
dissolved	  or	  have	  nowhere	  to	  report,	  or	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  managers,	  appointed	  by	  
the	  governors.	  	  In	  the	  new	  game,	  discussions	  have	  been	  less	  public,	  and	  they	  have	  been	  
dominated	  by	  utilities	  or	  others	  who	  are	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  decision-­‐
making	  or	  implementing	  change.54	  	  Such	  an	  approach	  to	  governance	  brings	  advantages,	  
but	  it	  also	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  promote	  effective	  consultation	  and	  public	  sharing	  
of	  information	  and	  knowledge.	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  new	  context	  or	  system	  of	  regional	  governance,	  those	  interests	  who	  have	  always	  
played	  a	  role	  in	  facilitating	  knowledge	  exchange	  across	  different	  systems	  are	  limited	  in	  
what	  they	  can	  achieve	  alone.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  New	  England	  Council,	  the	  New	  England	  
Canada	  Business	  Council,	  the	  Canadian	  Embassy	  and	  Consulates	  in	  Boston	  or	  New	  York,	  
the	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  Center,	  and	  other	  think	  tanks,	  associations,	  and	  the	  like	  are	  
limited	  in	  what	  they	  can	  achieve	  with	  respect	  to	  bringing	  different	  interests	  together	  
and	  sharing	  information	  across	  silos.	  	  	  They	  simply	  do	  not	  have	  the	  resources	  or	  
legitimacy	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  reinforcing	  overall	  good	  regional	  governance.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  despite	  growing	  interdependencies,	  common	  problems	  and	  regional	  issues,	  we	  
are	  ill	  equipped	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  new-­‐shared	  realities,	  let	  alone	  for	  determining	  how	  
we	  can	  deal	  with	  them	  effectively.	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Conclusion	  
	  
While	  functional	  thinkers	  emphasize	  the	  impact	  that	  external	  forces	  have	  on	  patterns	  of	  
agenda-­‐	  setting	  and	  public	  policy,	  recent	  experiences	  in	  Eastern	  Canada	  and	  New	  
England	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  power	  of	  embedded	  processes	  and	  
mechanisms	  to	  inhibit	  the	  transformation	  of	  dominant	  ideas,	  even	  when	  
interdependency	  is	  increasing.	  	  Leadership	  matters	  a	  great	  deal,	  as	  do	  inherited	  state-­‐
societal	  structures	  and	  processes	  that	  determine	  the	  possibilities	  for	  creating	  new	  
patterns	  of	  discourse,	  policy	  practice,	  and	  integration/interaction.	  	  	  
	  
Regionalization	  not	  only	  lacks	  institutional	  support,	  but	  governors	  have	  gone	  out	  of	  their	  
way	  to	  restrict	  new	  regional	  transformations	  and	  formations	  across	  state	  and	  provincial	  
boundaries.	  	  They	  have	  also	  acted	  to	  suppress	  information	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  
undermined	  and	  constrained	  opportunities	  to	  bring	  different	  interest	  together	  and	  
improve	  regional	  governance.	  	  Premiers	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  bystanders	  in	  all	  of	  this,	  
but	  they	  have	  also	  played	  their	  role	  in	  a	  new	  competitive	  regional	  game.	  	  Canadian	  
provinces	  are	  highly	  competitive	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  energy	  sector.	  	  There	  is	  little	  
evidence	  of	  collaboration,	  shared	  objectives,	  or	  integration.	  	  	  
	  
Despite	  challenges	  of	  interdependence,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  work	  together	  to	  solve	  energy	  
and	  other	  problems,	  internal	  political	  conditions	  and	  territorial-­‐institutional	  
configurations	  have	  trumped	  functional	  logic.	  	  In	  New	  England,	  partisan	  differences	  
have	  undermined	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  regional	  cleavages	  and	  knowledge	  sharing	  
across	  communities	  and	  systems.	  	  Strikingly,	  all	  of	  this	  has	  occurred	  with	  limited	  public	  
knowledge	  or	  engagement.	  	  In	  Canada,	  the	  strong	  tradition	  of	  province-­‐building	  has	  
continued	  but	  expanded	  south.	  	  Premiers	  have	  restricted	  public	  engagement	  and	  
information.	  	  They	  have	  also	  maintained	  control	  over	  the	  development	  process	  and	  
discouraged	  new	  formations	  and	  transformations	  across	  provinces	  and	  states.	  	  Much	  of	  
this	  has	  involved	  “leaving	  it	  to	  government	  elites	  and	  experts	  in	  utilities	  to	  work	  out”	  
rather	  than	  providing	  opportunities	  for	  sharing	  public	  knowledge	  and	  information	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  might	  strengthen	  cross-­‐border	  identities	  and	  discourses.	  	  	  
	  
We	  have	  found	  that	  embedded	  institutions	  and	  governance	  traditions	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  
crucial	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  pace	  and	  direction	  of	  regional	  transformation	  and	  
restructuring.	  	  Nothing	  is	  inevitable.	  	  Despite	  challenges	  of	  interdependence,	  creating	  
new	  ways	  for	  reinventing	  regional	  governance	  ultimately	  depends	  on	  political	  
conditions	  and	  institutional	  configurations	  that	  permit	  good	  regional	  solutions	  also	  to	  be	  
good	  politics.	  	  Functionalism	  is	  not	  enough,	  and	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  discussion	  and	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agreed	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  projects	  risk.”	  	  “ISO	  New	  England,	  the	  independent	  
system	  operator	  for	  the	  six	  Northeastern	  states,	  will	  ensure	  that	  the	  new	  transmission	  
system	  integrates	  smoothly	  with	  the	  current	  electric	  grid	  and	  will	  eventually	  control	  the	  
U.S.	  portion	  of	  the	  line,	  the	  commission	  said.”	  
http://www.law360.com/articles/103547/fierc-­‐oks-­‐funding-­‐plan-­‐for-­‐us-­‐canada-­‐power-­‐
line.	  
39	  For	  a	  review	  of	  Quebec	  Hydro	  infrastructural	  capacity	  and	  plans	  for	  the	  future	  in	  New	  
England	  and	  New	  York,	  see	  hydroforthefuture.com/projects/34/developing-­‐outside-­‐
markets	  	  
40	  Interviews.	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41	  “In	  New	  Hampshire	  and	  other	  New	  England	  states,	  large	  scale	  hydropower	  does	  not	  
count	  toward	  the	  renewable	  quotas	  that	  utilities	  must	  meet.”	  	  There	  are	  calls	  for	  a	  
common	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  playing	  field.	  	  See	  http://www.	  Bizjournals.com/	  
42	  See	  Lisa	  Linowes,	  “Wind	  Forcing:	  New	  England’s	  Coming	  Energy	  War.”	  	  June	  5,	  2013.	  	  
http:/www.masterresource.org/2013/06/wind-­‐forcing-­‐new-­‐england-­‐war/	  
43	  There	  has	  been	  an	  ongoing	  battle	  over	  the	  building	  of	  a	  pipeline	  to	  the	  Pacific	  coast.	  	  
The	  British	  Columbia	  government	  has	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  majority	  of	  economic	  benefits	  
go	  to	  Alberta,	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  for	  the	  coastal	  province	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  project	  that	  
poses	  environmental	  risks.	  	  
44	  See	  Beth	  Daley,	  “Proposal	  for	  Northern	  Pass	  Transmission	  Line	  Shifts.”	  	  Boston	  Globe,	  
June	  28,	  2013.	  	  
45	  See	  Rob	  Antle,	  “Not	  Enough	  Info	  to	  Choose	  Best	  Power	  Option,	  PUB	  says.”	  	  CBC	  News,	  
April	  2,	  2012.	  	  
file:///Volumes/NO%20NAME/Not%20enough%20info%20to%20choose…%20says%20-­‐
%20Nfld.%20&%20Labrador%20-­‐%20CBC%20News.webarchive	  
46	  See	  Bill	  29	  (2012)	  An	  ACT	  TO	  Amend	  THE	  ACCESS	  TO	  INFORMATION	  AND	  PROTECTION	  
OF	  PRIVACY	  ACT.	  	  NL	  LEGISLATIVE	  ASSEMBLY.	  	  	  
47	  Tomblin,	  Ottawa	  and	  the	  Outer	  Provinces.	  	  
48	  See	  “Irving	  Oil	  studies	  NG	  power	  plant	  for	  New	  England	  Market.”	  	  
www.electricalforum.com/News/Mar09/IrvingstudiesNGplantfor	  
NewEnglandmarket.html.	  	  
49	  See	  “Oil	  Allies	  outspend	  opponents	  in	  S.	  Portland	  campaign.”	  
http://www.mainebiz.biz/article/20131008/NEWS0101/131009951/oil-­‐allies-­‐outspend-­‐
opponents-­‐in-­‐s-­‐portland-­‐campaign.	  	  




52	  A	  recent	  Vermont	  newspaper	  article	  discusses	  the	  challenges	  facing	  Vermont	  
Governor	  Peter	  Shumlin	  as	  he	  and	  other	  governors	  see	  themselves	  as	  the	  “center	  of	  a	  
provincial	  balancing	  act”	  with	  Quebec	  and	  Newfoundland	  and	  Labrador	  battling	  over	  US	  
utilities.	  	  In	  this	  race	  south,	  Quebec	  Gaz	  Metro	  recently	  beat	  out	  a	  powerful	  NL	  company	  
(Fortis)	  and	  purchased	  Vermont’s	  largest	  electrical	  utility,	  Central	  Vermont	  Public	  
Corporation.	  	  For	  more	  details,	  see	  Eric	  Blokland,	  “Canadian	  Power	  Brokers	  Look	  to	  
Transmit	  Electricity	  South.”	  VTDodger.org.	  	  
53	  See	  Tim	  Kiladze,	  Fortis	  Tries	  Its	  Hand	  at	  Another	  U.S.	  Takeover.”	  	  Globe	  and	  Mail,	  
September	  2012.	  	  
54	  See	  for	  example,	  the	  website	  for	  the	  New	  England	  States	  Committee	  on	  Electricity	  
that	  dominates	  regional	  discussions	  in	  the	  new	  context.	  	  It	  is	  made	  up	  of	  managers	  
(representatives	  of	  competing	  state	  utilities).	  	  These	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  New	  England	  
Governors	  and	  serve	  at	  their	  pleasure.	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